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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The integration of euro-area financial markets since the launch of the euro in 1999 has been 
at the center of attention in the policy debate and academic literature. This paper 
complements this much-explored line of research by examining a subject that has attracted 
much less attention—namely, the characteristics of the euro area’s external portfolio 
investment, and particularly  the geographical allocation of the international equity portfolios 
held by euro area investors.
1 
 
The geography of the euro area’s external equity holdings is important for several reasons. 
First, the level of holdings in each international market is a direct determinant of the euro 
area’s exposure to external financial shocks. Second, it also useful to assess whether 
international investment provides diversification against internal risks. Third, differences in 
the composition of international portfolios between the euro area and other major economic 
blocs (e.g. the United States and Japan) may generate asymmetric responses to international 
financial crises or global shocks, that in turn may pose a challenge for coordinated 
management of the international financial system. 
 
Our empirical work is made possible by the release of the International Monetary Fund’s 
Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey (CPIS). This dataset, described more in detail in 
Section II, provides a unique perspective on the geographical patterns of international 
portfolio holdings for most major international investors, including the entire euro area.  
 
We analyze the international equity holdings of euro area investors from several different 
perspectives. We examine the external holdings of the aggregate euro area, as well as those 
of individual euro area members. We first ask the question of whether (all else equal) euro 
area members are more likely to invest in each other, and then investigate whether member 
countries have significantly different investment patterns in terms of extra-euro area 
holdings. The former exercise is a simple test of whether the move to a single currency has 
led (at least so far) to increased intra-union equity market integration; if the latter reveals 
substantial heterogeneity across member nations, this may be a source of asymmetric wealth 
dynamics across the euro area. 
 
Our main findings can be summarized as follows. At the end of 2001, the euro area was 
already a major portfolio equity investor—larger than the United States, if intra-euro area 
equity holdings are not netted out. With regard to bilateral investment holdings, some 
interesting patterns emerge: in particular, the importance of Luxembourg as both as an 
international portfolio investor and the recipient of significant portfolio equity investment 
from some euro-area countries (such as Belgium, Germany, and Italy).  
 
                                                 
1 See Baele at al. (2004) on the current state of financial integration within the euro area and 
Anderton et al. (2004) for a general review of the euro area’s external financial linkages.    - 2 - 
 
Holdings by euro-area countries outside the euro area appear to be associated with host 
countries’ stock market size, bilateral trade links, and proxies for ‘cultural proximity’. We 
also find evidence that, in comparison with other OECD countries, euro-area countries tend 
to invest in each other substantially more than underlying trade patterns and other 
fundamentals would suggest.  
 
As is discussed later in the paper, this contribution applies underlying conceptual and 
empirical frameworks developed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). A number of other 
recent papers have also examined the pattern of bilateral portfolio equity investment. For 
example, Yildirim (2003) focuses on the role of various corporate governance indicators in 
explaining bilateral investment patterns. Bertaut and Kole (2004) underline in particular the 
fact that most countries are ‘underweight’ in their holdings of U.S. stocks, as compared to 
other international asset holdings, while Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) jointly study trade in 
goods and assets in a simultaneous equations framework, using bilateral data on bank loans 
as well as portfolio holdings. Finally, Vlachos (2004) explores the importance of regulatory 
harmonization for bilateral patterns in portfolio holdings.  
 
Some other papers have focused more specifically on the bilateral investment patterns of 
individual countries: the United States (Ahearne, Griever, and Warnock (2004), Mann and 
Meade (2002); Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz, and Williamson (2003)) and Ireland (Honohan 
and Lane (2000)). We discuss their findings in Section IV, when presenting the results for the 
determinants of bilateral investment patterns for the euro area as a whole.  
  
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. Section II reviews the theoretical 
literature. Section III briefly describes the dataset, and section IV provides some stylized 
facts on the geographical distribution of international portfolio equity holdings. Section V 
presents the empirical analysis, focusing first on the geographical allocation of aggregate 
euro-area holdings, and subsequently on the determinants of bilateral portfolio equity 
holdings by euro-area countries outside the euro area, as well as on the determinants of 
equity holdings by the entire set of OECD countries. Section VI provides some concluding 
remarks.  
 
II.   THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
In laying out a theoretical framework, we follow the analysis in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti 
(2004).  We first discuss an approach that highlights frictions in product markets rather than 
capital markets in explaining asymmetric portfolios, before turning to theories that rather 
attribute heterogeneous portfolios to financial and informational frictions.  
 
Regarding the former, Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) construct a two-country model showing 
that the existence of trading costs (or, equivalently, heterogeneous preferences) in product 
markets naturally generates a home bias in equity positions, even if global financial markets 
are complete. Subsequently, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) have extended this model to an 
N-country setting. The intuition is that such trade frictions in product markets generate 
differences in consumption patterns across countries which, in turn, imply that investors face   - 3 - 
 
heterogeneous country-specific risk profiles: an investor in country A cares much more about 
a productivity shock in country B than in country C, if her consumption relies on imports 
from country B but not on imports from country C. Moreover, under certain conditions, the 
optimal hedge is to tilt national portfolios towards those countries that feature most 
prominently in the basket of imports. 
 
In terms of frictions in asset markets, Cooper and Kaplanis (1986) and Martin and Rey 
(2004) develop models in which investment costs vary on a bilateral basis.
2 A natural 
interpretation is that such cost variation is generated by informational barriers that vary 
across country pairs, due to differences in factors such as language, cultural linkages and 
institutional commonalities.   
 
Another form of asset market imperfection relates to the inability to hedge all types of risk. 
Davis, Nalewaik and Willen (2001) focus on domestic labor income as a form of endowment 
risk that cannot be directly laid off in financial markets. In such an environment, differences 
in the pattern of labor income risk across countries imply that investors will optimally select 
different international portfolios, since the covariances between domestic income and the 
returns on the various international stockmarkets will be a key determinant of portfolios.  
 
These theoretical contributions provide a guide to our empirical work. Overall, they suggest 
that bilateral equity holdings should be related to the size of source-country imports from the 
destination country, to proxies for informational and institutional barriers to bilateral asset 
trade, and to the pattern of covariances between source-country income and stock market 
returns in the destination countries. 
 
 
III.   THE COORDINATED PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT SURVEY 
A.   The Dataset 
Our data on asset holdings are drawn from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey 
(CPIS) that is managed by the International Monetary Fund.
3 This dataset reports portfolio 
holdings for 1997, 2001 and 2002 for each participating country, with the geographical 
decomposition across 218 destination countries/territories. We focus on the 2001 data, since 
the 1997 survey was a based on a narrower set of investor nations, while the 2002 data are in 
some cases derived from an extrapolation of the 2001 benchmark survey data rather than 
representing truly ‘new’ data.  
. 
                                                 
2 See also the application in Martin and Rey (2000). The working paper version of Ahearne 
at al (2004) provides a useful account of the model originally developed by Cooper and 
Kaplanis (1986). 
3  The data are available at http://www.imf.org/external/np/sta/pi/datarsl.htm.    - 4 - 
 
While the CPIS represents a major advance in availability of data on bilateral investment 
positions, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) highlight a number of limitations that are relevant 
for the euro area. First, there may be under-reporting of assets by CPIS participants. For 
example, the German survey did not cover holdings by households. As a result, the portfolio 
assets reported in the CPIS survey (US$800 billion), are over US$200 billion lower than 
those reported in the International Investment Position (which are estimated making use of 
flow data, and therefore include household holdings as well). Under-reporting is also likely 
to occur, more generally, for assets held in offshore centers for tax shelter reasons. Second, 
the bilateral data can be distorted by third-party holdings, by which a resident in country A 
holds securities in country B through an institution residing in country C. This intermediation 
is filtered out of the data if the end investors are surveyed; however, there will be mis-
measurement if the surveys are based on custodians. Third, the CPIS is still in its infancy and 
it is surely the case that not all countries have successfully implemented best-practice 
collection methods.   
 
B.   The Major Investor Nations 
Table 1 lists the largest foreign investors as reported by the 2001 survey, as well as some 
estimates of portfolio equity holdings at end-2003. Focusing first on the 2001 data, the total 
recorded level of portfolio equity investment in the CPIS was US$5.16 trillion. If intra-euro 
area holdings are included, the total portfolio equity holdings of the euro area exceed those of 
the United States. If we exclude intra-euro area holdings (over US$800 billion) the euro area 
becomes the second largest foreign portfolio equity investor, with portfolio equity assets 
equal to about 15 percent of euro-area GDP (as opposed to 16 percent of GDP in the United 
States).  
 
As shown in the second column of Table 1, these general patterns also apply to the stocks of 
aggregate portfolio equity holdings at the end of 2003 (as captured in the International 
Investment Positions data) —once again, total euro-area equity assets are larger than U.S. 
holdings if intra-euro area holdings are not netted out, and are equivalent to around 30 
percent of the area’s GDP. 
 
C.   Portfolio equity holdings by euro-area countries 
The total holdings of individual euro area countries are listed in the first column of Table 2. 
In particular, the size of Luxembourg’s portfolio equity holdings, associated with this 
country’s role as a financial center, is remarkable—they are the second largest in the euro 
area and the fourth largest among all world’s reporting countries. The second column in 
Table 2 shows average per-capita values for international portfolio equity investment: for the 
euro area as a whole, the average per capita value is $5,700. However, this obscures a 
considerable range, from a maximum of $725,000 for Luxembourg to a minimum of just 
$100 in Greece. The last two columns shows the allocation of international equity holdings 
between fellow euro-area members and extra-euro area destinations. The extent of ‘euro area 
bias’ is considerable: 48 percent of cross-border equity investments by euro area members   - 5 - 
 
are in other member countries. Again, there is considerable cross-country heterogeneity: the 
euro area bias is 79 percent for Belgium but only 25 percent for Ireland. 
 
When studying the geographical allocation of portfolio equity investment of individual euro-
area countries, it is important to keep one key factor in mind—namely, the remarkable 
importance of investment in small financial centers, particularly Luxembourg. For example, 
assets held in offshore and financial centers are over 40 percent of total portfolio equity 
assets for Belgium and Italy, and over 25 percent in Germany (almost entirely reflecting 
holdings in Luxembourg). 
4 Clearly these centers are not the ultimate destination of 
investment; rather, they serve as intermediaries. It follows that the measured geographical 
allocation of portfolio equity investment by countries investing heavily in financial centers is 
unavoidably distorted. Interestingly, Belgium, Germany, and Italy emerge from Table 2 as 
countries with a strong ‘euro-area bias’, while Luxembourg’s investment is skewed towards 
countries outside the euro area. This suggests that part of the intra-euro area portfolio equity 
investment by Belgian, German, and Italian residents may actually have countries outside the 
euro area as the ultimate destination. More generally, devising methods to allocate, albeit 
roughly, equity investment in offshore centers to their ultimate destination is an important, if 
difficult, research objective. 
 
D.   Portfolio equity investment, country size, and stock market capitalization 
Table 3 (reproduced from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004)) provides a brief summary of the 
size of economies, their stock markets, and the share of domestic stocks owned by non 
residents for major international investors. A couple of interesting stylized facts emerge from 
this table. First, at end-2001 exchange rates and prices, the United Kingdom and the United 
States’ stock market capitalization largely exceeded their aggregate weight in world GDP, 
while for the euro area its aggregate weight in world GDP exceeded its relative stock market 
capitalization. Second, the fraction of the domestic stock market held by non-resident 
portfolio investors was substantially higher in the euro area and the United Kingdom (over a 
third) than in the United States and Japan (13 and 17 percent, respectively). 
5 
 
Table 4, also reproduced from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004), summarizes the geographical 
distribution of portfolio equity investment among the main advanced economies by 
comparing the share of foreign equity investment in the host country with the share of the 
host country’s stock market capitalization in the rest of the world’s stock market 
capitalization. We use the latter as a simple predictive benchmark for the allocation of 
foreign portfolio equity investment. Japan’s foreign equity investment is the most closely 
                                                 
4 Indeed, Luxembourg is the primary destination for portfolio equity investment undertaken 
by Belgian, German, Greek, Italian, and Portuguese residents. 
5 Note that Table 4 only reports domestic shares owned by portfolio equity investors (who by 
definition hold participations below 10 percent). Adding the shares held by direct investors 
would increase the measured size of non-resident ownership of domestic shares.   - 6 - 
 
aligned with the benchmark, while the least closely aligned is the United Kingdom, which 
invests much more in the euro area than in the United States. The euro area has higher than 
predicted investment in the rest of the world and especially in the United Kingdom, and 
lower than predicted investment in Japan and the United States. Finally, the United States is 
“overweight” in the United Kingdom and the rest of the world, and underweight in the euro 
area and especially in Japan. 
 
E.   Geographical allocation of euro area portfolio equity investment 
Tables 5 and 6 focus on portfolio equity assets held by euro-area residents outside the euro 
area. Table 5 presents the geographical allocation across major regions. Relative to the shares 
in non-euro area aggregate stock market capitalization (the final row in the table), the 
portfolios of euro area members show considerable deviations. For the aggregate euro area, 
there is under-investment (relative to the benchmark) in the United States, Japan and the rest 
of Asia and over-investment in the United Kingdom and Latin America. The Netherlands is 
closest to the benchmark allocation but Greece, Ireland, and Spain have heavily skewed 
portfolios, with these countries in particular over-weighting the United Kingdom. It is also 
noteworthy that the Iberian countries are the heaviest investors in Latin America. 
 
A more detailed breakdown of the destination of the euro area’s external investments, which 
includes all countries with at least 0.1 percent of the aggregate euro area portfolio of extra-
euro area holdings, is provided in Table 6. This table highlights the strong bilateral variation 
in the data. For instance, Sweden accounts for portfolio shares that range from 0.6 percent 
(Greece) to a remarkable 29.6 percent (Finland), while the Swiss share ranges from 3.9 
percent (Ireland) to 14.0 percent (Germany). Among the emerging market destinations, 
Portuguese holdings in Brazil and South Africa are especially high at 6.8 percent and 4.2 
percent respectively of its total external portfolio, while Austria is heavily invested in Central 
and Eastern Europe.
6 
Taken together, the patterns highlighted so far demonstrate that the composition of the euro 
area’s international portfolio cannot be simply explained by the cross-country distribution of 
stock market capitalizations. Moreover, it is clear that there is considerable heterogeneity in 
the international portfolios of the individual euro area member countries. In the next section, 
we investigate the determinants of these spatial patterns using regression analysis. 
 
IV.   ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
We focus on a single cross-sectional observation for the structure of external equity 
portfolios for the year 2001.
7  
                                                 
6 See also Bertaut and Kole (2004) on the Austrian data. 
7As noted in the introduction, the 1997 survey refers to a much smaller set of source 
countries; the newly-released results for end-2002 are highly correlated with the end-2001 




A.   Determinants of the International Equity Holdings of the Aggregate Euro area 
We begin the empirical analysis by investigating the determinants of the spatial pattern in the 
international equity holdings of the aggregate euro area. The empirical specification is given 
by 
 
  log( ) log( )
euro euro euro euro




j x is the aggregate level of equity investment by euro-area countries in destination 
country  j , 
euro
j IMP is the aggregate level of euro-area imports from country  j  and 
euro
j F is a 
vector of other country characteristics that influences the level of euro-area investment in 
country  j .  As discussed in Section II, Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) develop a framework 
in which the level of bilateral trade plays an important role in the design of optimal 
portfolios; trade also plays a role as an informational variable. The vector 
euro
j F  comprises a 
set of variables that may proxy for financial and informational frictions. 
 
The results are given in Table 7. As a benchmark, the specification in column (1) just 
includes stock market capitalization as a regressor: if spatial allocations just reflected each 
country’s share in global market capitalization, this variable should enter with a unitary 
coefficient and have complete explanatory power. In this simple regression, it turns out the 
simple elasticity of bilateral holdings with respect to market capitalization is indeed unitary, 
highly significant, and with substantial explanatory power—the adjusted 
2 R is 0.82.
 8  
 
Regressions in column (2)-(5) add additional controls that may help explain the remaining 
proportion of the cross-sectional variation. In column (2), the volume of euro area imports 
from the destination country is added to the specification. Bilateral trade may matter for a 
variety of reasons. Following the theoretical discussion in section II, purchasing the equity of 
a trading partner may act as a hedge against consumption risk emanating to shocks to imports 
from that country. However, more generally, trade linkages may also increase familiarity 
with a given destination, influencing portfolio decisions for informational reasons. The 
estimates in column (2) indeed show that imports are significant in explaining the spatial 
allocation of euro-area investment; the inclusion of imports also leads to a reduction in the 
point estimate and significance level for the stock market capitalization variable. These 
results remain stable in the broader specifications in columns (3)-(5).
9 
                                                 
8 The results are essentially unchanged if the largest destination country (the United States) is 
dropped  from the sample. 
9 The estimated coefficient is in the range (0.95-0.99) in columns (2)-(5), which is close to 
the unitary coefficient predicted by the model of Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004).   - 8 - 
 
 
The specification is further extended in column (3) to include two informational proxies 
(distance and a “Euro Culture” dummy), plus a dummy for financial center destinations.
10 
The “Euro Culture” dummy takes the value 1 if a major European language is in widespread 
use in the destination country and/or if the destination was a colonial relationship with a 
European country, and 0 otherwise. The results in column (3) show that the financial center 
dummy is quite significant, but neither distance nor “Euro Culture” dummy variables 
individually significant. The results for these variables are broadly similar in columns (4) and 
(5). 
 
Column (4) adds the Sharpe ratio for the destination country to the specification: if returns 
are expected to persist, a history of a high return-risk ratio may boost inward investment.  
Indeed, the estimates in both columns (4) and (5) support this notion, with the Sharpe 
variable turning out to be significant. Finally, the correlation in output growth rates and the 
correlation in stock market returns between the destination country and Germany (as a proxy 
for the euro area) are also included in the specification in column (5).
11 Allocations that are 
driven by a diversification motive should be reflected in a negative sign on these correlation 
variables: while the stock market correlation variable enters negatively, the output correlation 
is significantly positive (but neither is individually significant).  
 
Overall, Table 7 does a good job in explaining the spatial pattern in the aggregate euro area’s 
portfolio of external equity holdings, capturing 90 percent of the variation. In particular, 
deviations from the cross-country distribution of stock market capitalization are largely 
explained by trade linkages, a destination’s status as a financial center, and the Sharpe ratio.
12 
 
Other papers focusing on a single-country portfolio holdings have used somewhat different 
specifications. For example, Ahearne et al. (2004) use as dependent variable the degree of 
home bias, defined as one minus the ratio of the share of foreign equities in the United 
States’ and world portfolios. They find that the portion of a country’s portfolio that is listed 
in the U.S. is a key determinant of that country’s weight in U.S. portfolios. Dahlquist et al. 
(2003) find instead that the share of a country’s equity in the U.S. portfolio is much more 
                                                 
10 We also investigated two further distance-related variables: a dummy for European Union 
membership (i.e. picking up Denmark, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and the difference 
in time zones (i.e. the time difference between the destination and Central European time). 
Neither variable was significant and their inclusion did not alter any of the other results. 
11 We also tried the correlation between the foreign stock market return and the German 
output growth rate: this was insignificant and did not affect the results for the other 
regressors.  
12 Other potential regressors (capital controls; restrictions on foreign ownership; financial 
trading costs) were found not to be important. Such variables are likely highly correlated 
with the level of stock market capitalization that is included in all specifications.   - 9 - 
 
strongly correlated with that country’s weight in the world “float” portfolio (shares available 
to investors who are not controlling shareholders) than with the weight in the standard 
‘world” portfolio.
13 Finally, Honohan and Lane (2001) show that the geographical pattern of 
Ireland's international portfolio investment matches Irish trade patterns more closely than the 
destination countries’ financial market size. 
 
 
B.   International Holdings by Individual Euro-Area Countries 
We turn next to the exploration of possible heterogeneity across euro-area members in terms 
of their external investment patterns. To this end, we employ the specification developed by 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004): 
 
  log( ) log( ) ij i j ij ij ij xI M P F φ φσ γ ε =++ + + (2) 
 
where the set of source countries {} i  is restricted to the euro-area member countries. Relative 
to the previous section, the panel nature of this setup allows us to include a double set of 
fixed effects (source- and host-country dummies), in addition to variables that vary along the 
bilateral dimension. The inclusion of source dummies means that we are not trying to explain 
why euro-area member countries may vary in the aggregate scale of their external holdings; 
we only focus on the geographical distribution of such holdings. The host dummies control 
instead for those characteristics of the destination countries that make a given country more 
or less generally attractive to all investors, regardless of origin. As such, this “double fixed 
effects” specification targets the reasons why particular bilateral portfolio shares may vary 
across the euro area. Since this specification means that only explanatory variables that have 
variation along both sample dimensions can be included in the regression, the effect of 
variables such as stock market capitalization, income per capita, country size are soaked up 
by the source and host country dummy variables.  
 
All regressions in this and later sections exclude source and host offshore and small financial 
centers.
14 These centers act primarily or exclusively as intermediaries, rather than being true 
sources or final destinations of investment. Ideally, we would wish to “re-allocate” the funds 
                                                 
13 In common with the Ahearne et al (2004) study, these authors study the US portfolio in 
1997. We do not have updated data on the “free float” market capitalization for the countries 
in our study. 
14 Among the euro-area source countries, we exclude Luxembourg. According to a 
decomposition by the Irish Central Statistical Office, a sizable fraction of Irish portfolio 
investment (close to 80 percent in 2001) is also undertaken in the International Financial 
Services Center. Excluding Ireland as well among source countries yields very similar 
results. A complete data appendix with a list of host countries and territories for each sample 
is available from the authors upon request.   - 10 - 
 
invested by source economies in financial centers to their ultimate destination. However, this 
type of exercise is fraught with uncertainty, also given the limited available information on 
the pattern of investment of these centers.
15 Nevertheless, to the extent that every dollar 
invested by a source country in a financial center is invested by the financial center in the 
same way as the average dollar invested abroad by the source country, the exclusion of such 
centers has no implications for the empirical analysis. This is the case since re-allocating 
holdings in offshore centers to their ultimate destinations would affect bilateral holdings only 
up to a common factor of proportionality. Given that the regressions are run in log form, this 
factor of proportionality would be soaked up by the fixed source-country effects. Be as it 
may, the exclusion of several financial centers is unavoidable, given the lack of data on 
macroeconomic variables, bilateral trade, and stock market capitalization and returns. 
 
Table 8 displays the regression results. Panel least squares estimates are reported in columns 
(1) and (2); the results from the Tobit estimator are shown in columns (3) and (4). The Tobit 
estimates are included, since many of the observed bilateral observations are equal to zero 
and we want to allow for the possibility that these zero values reflect censoring. The 
specification in columns (1) and (3) includes the following bilateral variables: the level of 
imports by the source country from the host country; distance between the two countries; a 




The specification in columns (2) and (4) is expanded to include some bilateral financial 
correlations (the correlation in stock market returns and the correlation between output 
growth in the source country and the stock market return in the destination country), plus a 
dummy variable that scores one if source and host countries share legal systems with 
common origins and zero otherwise. This broader specification comes at the price of a 
substantial decline in the number of available observations: restrictions on data availability 
mean that the number of these countries drops from 146 to 31 (and observations from 1035 to 
285) with the addition of the financial correlation variables in columns (2) and (4). However, 
as shown in Table 9, the substantial reduction in sample size entails only a very modest 
reduction in the total size of equity holdings in the regression sample (less than 1 percent)—
close to 600 of the 750 lost observations feature equity holdings equal to zero.  
 
A number of patterns are evident across the specifications in columns (1)-(4) of Table 5. 
First, the variation in portfolio allocations by euro area member countries is significantly 
                                                 
15 An exception is Luxembourg, which reports in detail its international equity holdings. 
16 See Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) for a detailed discussion of this choice of explanatory 
variables. Relative to the specification in that paper, we do not include the time zone 
difference between source and destination countries, since there is very little difference in 
time zones across euro area member countries. We also drop a currency union dummy since 
there are no available observations for those destination countries that are in monetary unions 
with euro area member countries.   - 11 - 
 
correlated with the relative importance of the various destination countries as trading 
partners: euro-area members systematically hold larger equity stakes in those extra-union 
countries that supply a lot of imports to them. This holds true even though a number of 
gravity-type variables are included in the regression, which are highly collinear with the 
pattern of bilateral trade.  
 
Second, there is general support for the notion that informational variables are also 
important. Beyond the familiarity interpretation for the role of trade in determining portfolio 
decisions, the information hypothesis is also supported by the significantly negative effect of 
distance (in columns (1) and (3)) and especially the positive effect of the colony dummy, 
which is statistically and economically significant in all specifications.
17 However, neither 
the common language dummy nor the tax treaty dummy offer any additional explanatory 
power.  
 
Among the bilateral correlation variables, only the stock market correlation is significant. 
However, it is in fact significantly positive, which goes again a diversification motive for the 
determination of portfolio allocations. The evidence tends therefore to suggest that countries 
invest in hosts that have a more similar economic structure. The coefficient on the common 
legal origin dummy is not estimated precisely, and is statistically insignificant.
18 
 
In summary, the results in Table 8 show that the heterogeneity in the international portfolio 
allocations by euro area member countries can be related to structural differences in the 
relations between individual member countries and the various destination countries. A 
robust pattern is that financial linkages are positively associated with trade linkages, with 




C.   Do Euro Area Members Invest Disproportionately in Each Other? 
In order to address this question, we expand the sample in two directions. First, we include 
all industrial countries in the set of source countries  {} i .  Second, we include all available 
country pairs in the specification: that is, cross-border investments within the euro area in 
addition to extra-euro area holdings. In addition, we slightly adapt our specification 
 
                                                 
17 The fact that distance is significantly negative only in the wider sample, where over half of 
the total observations are zero, suggests that distance helps explain whether euro-area 
countries invest or not in a specific destination, but is less helpful in explaining the amount of 
investment.  
18 The coefficient on common legal origin increases in size and becomes statistically 
significant if Ireland is excluded from the sample.   - 12 - 
 
 log( ) log( ) ij i j ij ij ij ij x EURODUM IMP F φ φβ σ γ ε =++ + + + (3) 
 
where  ij EURODUM  is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if both source and 
destination countries are members of the euro area and 0 otherwise. If this dummy turns out 
to be significant, it will indicate that (controlling for the other factors in the regression) euro 
area members indeed invest disproportionately in each other. 
 
Table 10 reports the results for this specification, as adapted from the original estimates in 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). As in Table 5, we report panel OLS regressions with fixed 
source and host effects in columns (1)-(2), while columns (3)-(4) report Tobit regressions. (In 
fact, it turns out that that the choice of estimator makes little difference in terms of the 
significance and value of the euro area dummy variable.)  As was the case for the sample in 
Table 8, adding stock market correlations and the index of legal origin curtail the sample size 
considerably, with the number of host countries dropping from 157 to 42 and over 1400 lost 
observations. However, as shown in  Table 11 most of the lost observations have equity 
holdings equal to zero (over 1000) and the cumulative value of equity holdings in the other 
lost observations is tiny (less than 1 percent) compared to total equity holdings in the sample.  
 
The results show that euro area dummy variable is not significant in the broader sample in 
columns (1) and (3) but that it is quite significant in the regressions in columns (2) and (4). 
The difference is not attributable to the inclusion of extra regressors: rather, it is the reduction 
in sample size that is important. Since it is that smaller destination countries that are excluded 
from the regressions in columns (2) and (4) by virtue of not having stock market data, it may 
be argued that it is these results that are relatively more interesting.  
 
The point estimate for the euro area dummy in both columns (2) and (4) is 0.48. This is a 
quantitatively large effect: it implies that equity investment in a euro area partner country is 
62 percent larger than in a non-euro area partner country, controlling for the other factors in 
the regression. This is a striking result in view of the fact that the regression includes many 
variables (such as trade and distance) that might be expected to mop up the euro area effect. 
 
One issue we have not discussed so far is the possible endogeneity of product trade to the 
degree of bilateral financial integration. In Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004) we present 
estimation results using instrumental variables, treating the level of imports; the correlation 
of GDP growth rates; the correlation of stock returns; and the correlation between domestic 
GDP growth and the foreign stock return as endogenous variables.
19 Results still show a 
                                                 
19 Our instrument list consists of: distance; the time difference; a border dummy; the lagged 
correlation in GDP growth rates; the lagged correlation in stock returns; and the lagged 
correlation between domestic GDP growth and the foreign stock return. In related work (but 
using a different empirical specification), Aviat and Coeurdacier (2004) find that the 
causality between bilateral asset holdings and trade in goods runs in both directions, with 
statistically and economically significant effects.   - 13 - 
 
strong and statistically significant effect of imports on equity holdings, with the colony 
dummy also retaining a statistically and economically significant coefficient.  
 
 
V.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper has provided a number of stylized facts concerning the size and geographical 
distribution of euro-zone portfolio equity holdings. It has shown that the euro area is a major 
portfolio equity investor, with aggregate holdings second only to those of the United States, 
and even larger if intra-euro area holdings are not netted out.  
 
For euro area countries, about half of international portfolio equity investment occurs outside 
the euro area and, relative to stock market capitalization, is particularly high in the United 
Kingdom. Some other interesting geographical patterns emerge—namely, the large portfolio 
equity investment by Austria in Central and Eastern Europe, and the significant share of 
Iberian investment that is allocated to Latin America. We also showed the remarkable 
importance of investment in financial centers—particularly Luxembourg—for a number of 
euro-area countries. 
 
More formal econometric analysis shows the pattern of investment of equity holdings for the 
euro area is strongly related to the size of host country characteristics such as stock market 
capitalization, bilateral trade ties and its status as a financial center. With regard to bilateral 
equity holdings of individual euro-area countries with destinations outside the euro area, 
again we find a strong link with trade ties and a common culture. Finally, in a sample of 
OECD investor countries we find evidence that intra-euro area equity investment is larger 
than what would be predicted on the basis of ‘fundamentals’ such as trade ties, distance, and 
co-movements in key macroeconomic variables. As data become available for later periods, 
it will be interesting to examine whether the intra-euro area equity holdings are rising more 
than proportionately relative to external holdings.   - 14 - 
 
VI.   REFERENCES 
Ahearne, Alan B., William Griever and Frank Warnock (2004), “Information Costs and     
the Home Bias,” Journal of International Economics 62, 313-336. 
 
Anderton, Robert, Filippo di Mauro and Fabio Moneta (2004), “Measuring Financial 
Integration in the Euro Area,” ECB Occasional Paper No. 14, May. 
 
Aviat, Antonin and Nicolas Coeurdacier (2004), “The Geography of Trade in Goods and 
Assets,” mimeo, Delta. 
 
Baele, Lieven, Annalisa Ferrando, Peter Hördahl, Elizaveta Krylova and Cyril Monnet 
(2004), “Measuring financial integration in the euro area,”ECB Occasional Paper 
No. 12, April. 
 
Bertaut, Carol and Linda Kole (2004), “What Makes Investors Overweight or 
Underweight? Explaining International Appetites for Foreign Equities,” Federal 
Reserve Board Bulletin 90 no. 1 (Winter), 19-31. 
 
Cooper, Ian and Evi Kaplanis (1986), “Costs to Crossborder Investment and International 
Equity Market Equilibrium,”. in Jeremy Edwards, Julian Franks, Colin Mayer and 
Stephen Schaefer (eds.), Recent Developments in Corporate Finance. Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 209-240. 
 
Coval, Joshua D. and Tobias J. Moskowitz (1999), “The Geography of Investment: 
Informed Trading and Asset Prices,” Journal of Finance LIV, 2045-2073. 
 
Dahlquist, Magnus, Pinkowitz, Lee, Rene M Stulz and Rohan Williamson (2003), 
“Corporate Governance and the Home Bias,” Journal of Financial and 
Quantitative Analysis 38 no. 1.  
 
Davis, Steven, Jeremy Nalewaik and Paul Willen (2001), “On the Gains to International 
Trade in Risky Financial Assets,” mimeo, Chicago Graduate School of Business. 
 
Honohan, Patrick and Philip R. Lane (2000), “Where Do the Irish Invest?,” Irish Banking 
Review, Autumn, 12-23. 
 
International Monetary Fund (2000), The Results of the 1997 Comprehensive Portfolio 
Investment Survey, Washington, DC. 
 
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2004), “International Investment 
Patterns,” IMF Working Paper 04/134, July.  
 
Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti (2005), “The External Wealth of Nations 
Mark II: Revised and Extended Estimates of External Assets and 
Liabilities,” mimeo, Trinity College Dublin and International Monetary 
Fund.   - 15 - 
 
 
La Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer (2003), “What Works 
in Securities Laws?,” mimeo, Harvard University, July. 
 
Mann, Catherine and Ellen Meade (2002), “Home Bias, Transaction Costs, And 
Prospects for the Euro: A More Detailed Analysis,” mimeo, Institute for 
International Economics and Center for Economic Performance, LSE.  
 
Martin, Philippe and Helene Rey (2000) “Financial Integration and Asset Returns,” 
European Economic Review 44, 1327-1350. 
 
Martin, Philippe and Helene Rey (2004), “Financial Super-Markets: Size Matters for 
Asset Trade,” Journal of International Economics 64, December, 351-81.  
 
Obstfeld, Maurice and Kenneth Rogoff (2001), “The Six Major Puzzles in International 
Macroeconomics. Is There a Common Cause?,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 
15, 339-390. 
 
Portes, Richard and Hélène Rey (2005), “The Determinants of Cross-Border Equity 
Flows,” Journal of International Economics 65 no. 2, March, 269-296.  
 
Rose, Andrew K. and Mark Spiegel (2004), “A Gravity Model of Sovereign Lending: 
Trade, Default and Credit,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers 51 no. 4 
(Special Issue), 50-63.  
 
Yildrim, Canan (2003), “Informational Asymmetries, Corporate Governance 
Infrastructure and Foreign Portfolio Equity Investment,” mimeo, Tilburg 




A.   Countries and regions participating in the 2001 Coordinated Portfolio 
Investment Survey: 
 
Argentina, Aruba, Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belgium, Bermuda, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Canada, Cayman Islands, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guernsey, Hong 
Kong SAR of China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Jersey, Kazakhstan, republic of Korea, Lebanon, Luxembourg, Macao SAR of 
China, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Netherlands, Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand, 
Norway, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, 
Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela.  
 
B.   Variables: sources and definitions 
Bilateral portfolio equity holdings: Portfolio equity instruments issued by host country  
residents and held by source country residents. Source: 2001 Coordinated Portfolio 
Survey.  
 
Source-country imports: Imports of goods by source countries from host countries 
(average 1997-2001). Source, International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics.  
 
Log distance: logarithm of Great Circle distance in miles between the capital cities of 
source and host country. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004).  
 
Correlation of stock returns: Correlation between the stock market returns of the host 
and source country, expressed in US dollars. Source; authors’ calculations based on 
returns data from Datastream and Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
 
Correlation in growth rates: correlation between the GDP growth rate in the source and 
host country. Source: authors’ calculations based on World Bank, World Development 
Indicators. 
 
Log domestic stock market capitalization: log of the domestic stock market 
capitalization in US dollars as of end-2001. Sources: Datastream, Morgan Stanley Capital 
International, national sources. 
 
Financial center dummy: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the country or 
territory is a ‘large’ international financial center.  
 
Sharpe ratio: average excess return of the country stock market relative to world returns, 
divided by the standard deviation of the excess return’s variability. Source: authors’ 
calculations based on Datastream and Morgan Stanley Capital International. 
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Common legal origin: Dummy variable taking the value of 1 if source and host countries 
have a legal system with a common origin (common law, French, German, or 
Scandinavian). Source: authors’ elaborations based on La Porta, López de Silanes, and 
Shleifer (2003).  
 
Tax treaty: dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the source and host country have a 
tax treaty enacted prior to 1999. Source: authors’ elaborations based on treaty data taken 
from www.unctad.org. 
 
Common Language: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country share a 
common language. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004). 
 
Colony dummy: dummy taking the value of 1 if source and host country ever had a 
colonial relationship. Source: Rose and Spiegel (2004). 
 
Correlation growth-stock return: correlation between GDP growth in the source 
country and real stock returns in the host country, 1980-99. Source: authors’ calculations 
based on Datastream, Morgan Stanley Capital International, and World Development 









Euro area (including intra-area holdings)  1,739 2,486 
United States  1,613 1,972 
Euro area (external holdings)  894 1,332 
United Kingdom  558 750 
Switzerland 247 294 
Japan 227 274 
Canada 201 306 
 
Total reported holdings  5,169 .... 
 
* Sources: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey, and Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2005). 
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Table 2. The Euro Area’s International Equity Holdings at end-2001* 
 
 Total  Per  Capita  Intra-  Extra- 
  Value ($bn)  Value  ($000) Euro area  Euro area 
Euro area  1739 5.7 48.6  51.4
    
Austria  31 3.9 53.5  46.5
Belgium  106 10.3 78.9  21.1
France  202 3.4 51.1  48.9
Germany  381 4.6 59.7  40.3
Italy  239 4.1 64.4  35.6
Luxembourg  319 725.2 37.1  62.9
Netherlands  235 14.7 26.5  73.5
Finland  20 3.9 31.1  68.9
Greece  1 0.1 50.1  49.9
Ireland  136 35.3 25.5  74.5
Portugal  8 0.8 66.0  34.0
Spain  59 1.4 54.2  45.8
   
Max  381 725.2 25.5 74.5
Min  1.4 0.1 78.9 21.1
Range  380 725.1 46.6 53.4
 
* Source: IMF, Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey. 
Note:   End-2001 equity holdings in billions of US dollars. Intra-euro area refers to 
fraction of total holdings that is allocated to other members of the euro area. Extra-euro 
area is the fraction that is allocated to non-euro area countries.   - 20 - 
 
Table 3. Summary statistics on stock market size and foreign ownership (2001) 
 




market cap. in 
percent of world 
stock market cap. 
Percent of domestic 
stock market cap. 
owned by foreign 
portfolio investors 
Domestic GDP in 
percent of world 
GDP 
Euro  area  15.9 37.4 19.6 
Japan   9.3  16.7  13.4 
United  Kingdom  8.9 35.6 4.6 
United  States  48.9 12.9 32.3 
Other 17  N.A.  30.1 
 
Note: reproduced and updated from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). World stock market 
capitalization is calculated as the sum of stock market capitalization of 71 countries in the sample. 
In this calculation, holdings of shares by residents of one euro area country in another are 
considered domestic holdings.  
 
 
Table 4. Foreign portfolio equity investment: actual and predicted shares * 
 




     Source country 
 
Host country   
Theor. share  17.5% 17.5% 31.1%
Euro area  Actual share  16.8% 43.5% 28.6%
Theor. share  11.0% 10.2% 18.1%
Japan  Actual share  7.4% 9.9% 10.6%
Theor. share  10.6% 9.8%  17.4%
United Kingdom  Actual share  22.4% 13.0%  21.7%
Theor. share  58.1% 53.8% 53.6% 
United States  Actual share  45.8% 54.4% 24.3% 
Theor. share  20.3% 18.8% 18.7% 33.4%
Rest of the world  Actual share  24.5% 15.8% 22.3% 39.1%
 
* Reproduced and updated from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). Predicted share: ratio of host country's 
stock market capitalization to the stock market capitalization of the world minus the source country. Actual 
share: ratio of source country's equity investment in host country to total source country foreign equity 
investment  
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Table 5.  Regional Allocation of Extra-Euro Area Holdings 
 




Japan Asia  Latin 
America 
Euro area  45.8 22.4 7.4 5.2 1.6 
  
Austria 48.2 18.8 5.9 2.2 0.3 
Belgium 44.8 24.5 7.0 2.9 1.4 
France 42.5 25.9 7.4 2.3 0.6 
Germany 45.5 28.9 3.8 2.0 0.8 
Italy 44.8 19.0 12.1 5.2 3.3 
Luxembourg 42.7 15.3 10.3 7.6 2.9 
Netherlands 54.6 16.9 5.2 9.3 0.6 
Finland 31.8 16.9 5.4 1.2 0.0 
Greece 40.0 34.4 1.5 0.9 1.8 
Ireland 46.8 31.7 6.1 4.5 0.6 
Portugal 41.3 19.0 3.1 2.1 7.9 
Spain 32.4 39.7 13.1 0.2 4.7 
   
Max 54.6 39.7 13.1 9.3 7.9 
Min 31.8 15.3 1.5 0.2 0.0 
Range 22.8 24.4 11.6 9.1 7.9 
  
Mkt Cap  58.1 10.6 11.0 7.0 1.8 
 
Note:  Allocation shares of extra-euro area holdings. Mkt Cap is the share of each 
country/ region in extra-euro area aggregate stock market capitalization (based on 
Datastream indices). Asia is the sum of holdings in China, Hong Kong SAR, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan 
province of China, and Thailand. Latin America is the sum of holdings in Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, and Venezuela.   - 22 - 
 
Table 6. Extra-Euro area Holdings: Country Details 
 
Mkt Cap Euro area Max Min  Range 
 
United States  58.08 45.5 54.6 29.6  25.0 
United Kingdom  10.57 22.2 39.5 15.3  24.1 
Switzerland  2.96 8.2 14.0 3.9  10.1 
Japan  11.04 7.4 13.0 1.5  11.5 
Hong Kong SAR of China  2.27 2.3 6.7 0.0  6.7 
Sweden  1.07 2.2 29.6 0.6  29.0 
Australia  1.07 0.9 1.6 0.0  1.6 
Korea, Republic of   0.91 0.9 1.6 0.0  1.6 
Brazil  0.77 0.7 6.9 0.0  6.9 
Canada  2.68 0.6 1.1 -0.3  1.4 
Taiwan Prov. of China  1.15 0.5 1.3 0.0  1.3 
Mexico  0.59 0.5 1.0 0.0  1.0 
Denmark  0.39 0.5 3.1 0.0  3.1 
Singapore  0.52 0.4 0.7 0.0  0.7 
India  0.54 0.4 0.8 0.0  0.8 
Norway  0.31 0.3 1.3 0.1  1.2 
Russian Federation  0.35 0.3 0.6 0.0  0.6 
South Africa  0.35 0.3 4.3 0.0  4.3 
Malaysia  0.44 0.2 0.4 0.0  0.4 
Israel  0.28 0.2 0.4 0.0  0.4 
Hungary  0.05 0.2 2.5 0.0  2.5 
Poland  0.12 0.2 1.6 0.0  1.6 
Thailand  0.13 0.2 0.6 0.0  0.6 
China, P.R.  0.80 0.2 0.3 0.0  0.3 
Turkey  0.20 0.1 0.7 0.0  0.7 
Venezuela  0.01 0.1 0.5 0.0  0.5 
Argentina  0.09 0.1 1.1 0.0  1.1 
 
Note:  Allocation shares of extra-euro area holdings. Mkt Cap is the share of each country 
in extra-euro area aggregate stock market capitalization (based on Datastream indices).   - 23 - 
 
Table 7.  Determinants of the Euro Area’s International Equity Holdings  
 
       
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) 
       
Stock market capitaliz.  1.0 0.67 0.56  0.6 0.57 
  (10.9)*** (7.2)***  (4.2)***  (4.78)***  (3.29)*** 
         
Imports   0.69  0.8  0.78  0.77 
   (2.9)***  (2.74)***  (2.74)**  (2.6)** 
         
Distance     0.17  0.1  0.09 
     (0.92)  (0.58)  (0.46) 
         
Euro_Culture     0.59  0.37  0.54 
     (1.57)  (1.2)  (1.49) 
         
Financial Center     0.8  0.8  0.94 
     (2.55)***  (2.4)**  (2.73)** 
         
Sharpe       3.34  2.87 
       (2.69)**  (2.22)** 
         
Correl. in growth rates         0.78 
         (1.1) 
         
Correl. in stock returns         -0.98 
         (1.23) 
       
       
Observations  38 38  38  36 36 
Adjusted R
2 
0.82 0.88  0.90  0.90 0.91 
       
 
 
Note: The dependent variable is log of portfolio equity holdings of the source country in the host 
country. t-statistics reported in parenthesis.  *, **, ***  indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent confidence levels, respectively. 
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Table 8. International Equity Holdings by Euro-Area Member Countries 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
Panel FE  Panel FE  Tobit  Tobit 
Avg. imports, 1997-2001  0.17  0.24  0.39  0.24 
 (4.80)**  (2.24)*  (5.23)**  (2.38)* 
 
Log  distance  -0.85 -0.25 -0.88 -0.21 
 (5.78)**  (0.91)  (3.82)**  (0.83) 
 
Common language  0.16  0.33  0.32  0.28 
  (1.33) (1.20) (1.30) (1.11) 
 
Colony dummy  0.50  1.16  1.06  1.20 
  (2.77)** (2.82)** (3.14)** (3.16)** 
 
Tax  treaty  -0.03 -0.22 0.04  -0.25 
  (0.35) (1.03) (0.20) (1.29) 
 
Correl. in growth rates  0.22  0.27  0.51  0.28 
  (1.30) (0.65) (1.47) (0.71) 
 
Correl. in stock returns    2.29    2.47 
   (2.68)**    (3.08)** 
 
Correl. growth-stock ret.    0.07    -0.04 
   (0.18)    (0.11) 
 
Common legal origin    0.15    0.24 
   (0.89)    (1.49) 
 
Observations 1035  285  1035  285 
 
No. of host countries  146  31  146  31 
 
No. of source countries  11  11  11  11 
 
Adjusted R




Note: The dependent variable is log of 1+portfolio equity holdings of the source country in the 
host country. Regressions include fixed source and host country effects. t-statistics reported in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 




Table 9. Investment by euro-area countries outside the euro area 
Summary statistics 
 
 Total  holdings 
(billions US$) 




Total 894  12  223 1657 981 
   excluding Luxembourg  687  11  223 1451 890 
       in regressions (1) and (3)  668  11  146  1036  595 
       in regressions (2) and (4)  663  11  31 286 11   - 26 - 
 
Table 10. Bilateral portfolio equity holdings.  
 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Panel FE  Panel FE  Tobit  Tobit 
Euro  area  dummy  0.14 0.41 0.00 0.39 
  (1.01) (2.61)**  (0.01) (2.57)** 
 
Avg.  imports,  1997-2001  0.17 0.24 0.34 0.26 
  (7.38)*** (4.71)*** (7.84)*** (5.04)*** 
 
Log  distance  -0.40 -0.07 -0.40 -0.05 
  (6.32)*** (0.69)  (3.93)*** (0.48) 
 
Time  difference  0.04 -0.03  0.03 -0.04 
 (3.02)***  (1.72)*  (1.35)  (1.91)* 
 
Common  language  0.22 0.27 0.44 0.27 
  (3.05)*** (2.20)**  (3.39)*** (2.26)** 
 
Colony  dummy  0.33 0.25 0.60 0.27 
  (2.81)*** (1.34)  (3.11)*** (1.46) 
 
Tax treaty  -0.05  -0.27  0.03  -0.25 
  (0.74) (2.48)**  (0.32) (2.29)** 
 
Correl. in growth rates  0.22  0.10  0.35  0.03 
  (2.59)** (0.61)  (2.12)** (0.22) 
 
Correl. in stock returns    0.78    0.79 
   (1.68)   (1.72)* 
 
Correl. growth-stock ret.    -0.06    -0.15 
   (0.37)   (0.92) 
 
Common legal origin    0.18    0.20 
   (2.05)**   (2.37)** 
 
Observations  2426 790  2426 790 
 
No. of host countries  157  42  157  42 
 
No. of source countries  23  22  23  22 
 
Adjusted R
2 0.89  0.89     
 
 
Note: Reproduced from Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2004). The dependent variable is log of 
1+portfolio equity holdings of the source country in the host country. Regressions include fixed 
source and host country effects. t-statistics reported in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate statistical 
significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent confidence level, respectively.  
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Table 11. Portfolio equity investment of OECD countries 
Summary statistics 
 
Sample  Total holdings 
(billions US$) 




          
Total 4781 24 223 3541  2017
  Excluding offshore countries 
(Table 10, regressions (1)-(3)) 
3847 23 157 2426 1291
  No offshore countries (Table 10, 
regressions (2)-(4)) 
3820 23 42 792 27
 